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The Race to the Bottom in a Federal System:
Lessons from the World of Trade Policy
Alvin K. Klevorickt
A concern frequently expressed in policy discussions of both federalism and
international trade is that the decentralized units-states in the first case,
countries in the latter-will engage in interdependent behavior that will be
detrimental to all. The fear expressed is that left to choose their own individual
policies without external constraints, the separate entities will engage in "a race
to the bottom." The rhetoric is common to federalism and international-trade-
policy discussions, and the same set of theoretical economic models and
empirical studies is used to inform both conversations.
The policy prescription also is similar in the two cases. In the international
trade setting, countries, whether actual or potential trading partners, are
characterized as participating in "a race to the bottom," and the remedy urged
upon them is "harmonization." The vision evoked is of a group of misguided
athletes who have run off in the wrong direction and who need, to make things
right, only to transform themselves into a smooth-sounding a cappella singing
group. Although the image of the remedy is less evocative in discussions of
federalism, the call is again for some degree of uniformity brought about at the
behest of the central government.
The question is whether the common formulation accurately identifies an
important problem, and if it does, whether the proposed solution is appropriate.
In this Essay, I want to use the lens provided by discussions of the race to the
bottom as an issue in international trade policy to refract light on concern about
a race to the bottom in a federal system. I shall argue that the putative problem
of "a race to the bottom" mayor may not be a serious and substantial concern,
but that even if it is, "harmonization," as often described in discussions of
international trade policy, is not the elixir it is held out to be. The case for
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uniformity of standards in international trade is not nearly as compelling as its
proponents believe.
But there are important differences between exchanges among countries that
participate in the world trading system, or some regional trading zone, and
interactions among states in a federal system. These differences go to the core
of what it means for people living in different jurisdictions to consider
themselves, nevertheless, citizens of the same country. That characterization
has profound implications for the vision of the entitlements, rights, and
privileges that one citizen believes all are commonly due. The importance of
citizenship to discussions of federalism suggests that if there are races to the
bottom in a federal system, the case for harmonization or uniformity is stronger
there than in the international trade policy setting.
The concern that motivates the "race to the bottom" literature and
discussion of trade policy is that to attract mobile resources, especially firms,
governments will choose policies-for example, environmental standards,
occupational health and safety standards, competition policies-that entail
suboptimal requirements and afford their citizens too little protection-whether
from environmental hazards, unsafe or unhealthy working conditions, or cartel
behavior. The idea is that to render its country a hospitable location for
business, a government would establish lax standards to be imposed upon those
it wishes to draw. The result, it is argued, is that all countries will impose
standards that are much more lax than those they would set if they did not have
to compete with one another for the mobile resources. In short, they will race
to the bottom of the domain of standards. Moreover, the contest will be to no
avail because with all countries choosing the same standard, mobile resources
will have no incremental incentive to move. If only these countries could agree
not to compete in setting these standards, the argument concludes, each
government would choose the socially optimal level of the relevant standard,
and all their populations would be better served.
At the heart of this race to the bottom argument is the view that the
competitive process among countries is imperfect. The market failure
underlying the argument is distinct from the typical spillover argument
commonly identified with global environmental concerns. Indeed, the concern
about countries racing to the bottom is seen in sharpest relief when the typical
environmental externalities are eliminated by assumption, and for ease of
exposition I shall make that assumption.
The adherents of the view that nations race to the bottom focus on a defect
that actually sounds much more like the complaint of "ruinous competition" or
"destructive competition" that one firm in an industry makes about another
when the second has won the battle of the marketplace or the claim that
competitors in an industry make when trying to justify agreements among
themselves as to prices, quantities, qualities, and so on. In each case the claim
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is that the competitive process itself is harmful to the interests of one or more
competitors and to those they serve, consumers of the product. These are
claims about which most antitrust laws and competition laws are highly and
justifiably skeptical.
The picture of a race to the bottom that results from competition among
countries suggests that the problematic outcomes are due to failures in the
interactions among states. The failures are external to anyone country. This
suggests that repairing the market in which these countries compete would
eliminate the detrimental effects, in a manner analogous, for example, to the
way in which domestic antitrust policy is meant to preserve the competitive
process or regulation in the public interest is intended to remove a market
failure. I shall argue, however, that the concern that principally motivates
critics of the race to the bottom is quite frequently not a problem with the
character of the international competition but rather the failure of a state to
establish and attain a particular standard, an internal failure. The critic's
position is that from a normative perspective, the particular state is not setting
the appropriate standard and is not fulfilling the obligations that the critic
believes the state has to its population.
But since, at least as usually framed, at the center of the concern about a
race to the bottom is a criticism of the quality or caliber of competition among
countries, it should come as no surprise that whether or not there is a
theoretical basis for the argument is bound to be highly contextual. The recent,
very careful review of the literature on local public goods competition that John
D. Wilson has provided makes that point in a very compelling way. 1
Consider but two extremes. The appropriate first-cut formulation of the
race to the bottom argument, articulated cogently by Richard L. Revesz in
1992,2 posits two countries for whom the payoffs to competing in the choice
of environmental policies have the structure of a prisoner's dilemma game. If
this is an accurate picture of competition among governments, then those who
argue that there is a race to the bottom are on firm. ground. The governments
playing noncooperative strategies in their self-interest will choose strategies that
leave both countries' populations with lower environmental quality than they
want and could have.
On the other hand, suppose the competition among governments is perfect,
as it is in the first model of competition among jurisdictions presented by
1. See JohnD. Wilson, Capital Mobility andEnvironmental Standards: Is There aTheoretical Basis
for a Race to the Bottom?, in FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE?
VOLUME 1, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS (Jagdish N. Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996) [hereinafter
FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION].
2. See generally Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Campetition:Rethinkingthe "Race-to-
the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation. 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1210 (1992).
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Wallace E. Oates and Robert M. Schwab.3 Then the failure underlying the
argument that overly lax standards will result is absent. In the first Oates-
Schwab model, competition among jurisdictions results in socially optimal
levels of environmental quality all around. They go on to show, however, that
if distortionary taxation of capital must be used as an instrument or if there are
considerable divergences in the preferences of constituents in the same
jurisdiction, then this wonderful world of socially optimizing jurisdictions can
be shattered.
Moreover, the Oates-Schwab optimality-producing equilibrium is, naturally
enough, founded on specific assumptions about production technologies-for
example, constant returns to scale. In a somewhat different context, where two
jurisdictions compete for the plants of a single firm with market power, James
R. Markusen, Edward R. Morey, and Nancy Olewiler have demonstrated that
the character of the production technology will affect whether the location
pattern that results yields too much pollution, too little, or the optimal
amount.4 More generally, to the extent that models of Tiebout-like competition
are critical to arguments that interjurisdictional competition will yield optimal
levels of public goods-including environmental quality, labor standards, and
the like-it is important to recall Truman F. Bewley's critique of Tiebout
models.5 As Bewley demonstrated, only under very restrictive conditions can
competition among jurisdictions be shown, in general, to yield an equilibrium
that is Pareto optimal.
Since the existence of a race to the bottom among national governments
depends so much on the character of the competition among them, it is striking
that there is so little evidence beyond the anecdotal about the relevant market.
How do countries compete with one another with regard to environmental
controls, labor safety standards, consumer product safety standards? How
effective is lax environmental regulation as an instrument for attracting firms?
The few empirical studies of the impact of environmental regulation on firm
location in the U.S. domestic context that Revesz cites yield mixed results
about whether this is an effective tool.6 More recently, Adam B. Jaffe, Steven
R. Peterson, Paul R. Portney, and Robert N. Stavins have reviewed the
empirical literature that has studied the link between environmental regulation
and siting decisions for domestic plants. They conclude that the evidence does
not support the claim that environmental regulations have had a substantial,
3. See generally Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab. Economic Competition among
Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distonion Inducing?, 35 J. PuB. ECON. 333 (1988).
4. See generally James R. Markusen, Edward R. Morey & Nancy Olewiler, Competition in
Regional Environmental Policies When Plant Locations Are Endogenous, 56 J. PuB. BeON. 55 (1995).
5. See generally Truman F. Bewley, A Critique ofTiebout's Theory ofLocal Public Expenditures,
49 ECONOMETRICA 713 (1981).
6. See generally REVESZ, supra note 2.
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statistically significant effect on plant-location decisions.' Similarly, Arik
Levinson's recent study8 and his survey of other studies lead him to conclude
that "the literature as a whole presents fairly compelling evidence across a
broad range of industries, time periods, and econometric specifications, that
[environmental] regulations do not matter to site choice."9 We are led to
question how much of a race in environmental regulation there actually is.
Finally, in a recent article, Joel R. Paul has provided an excellent case
study of competition among European countries in the regulation of packaging
waste. 1O He describes the rich texture of the political economy of the
regulatory choices each country has made so far, and he shows how coopera-
tion may lead to less stringent rather than stricter controls, as it has in the
regulation of packaging waste.
But suppose the race to the bottom is a reality. Consider the remedy
proposed-harmonization of national standards or, to pursue the athletic
metaphor, levelling the international playing field. Note first that if those who
argue there is a race to the bottom are correct, and if the participants succeed
in reaching bottom (and not just racing toward it), then the outcome is actually
a harmonized one and the playing field is level-all standards are at the
bottom. The proposal that harmonizing national standards is superior to racing
them carries with it more freight than the term harmonization alone suggests.
The idea must be that there should be not only uniformity among standards but
uniformity at the "appropriate" or "correct" level. I intentionally use quotation
marks on the modifiers appropriate and correct because it is not clear how
either one of these terms, though I use them synonymously here, would be
defined. Furthermore, who would define them-that is, what agency,
organization, or other governing body would decide the standard to which all
nations should conform? And remember that this is a standard for the
environmentjillly within a country (no spillovers) or a standard for health and
safety standards of workers jillly within a country.
This is a major point in the argument at which a sharp divergence between
the international context and the federal structure of states of the union is
apparent. For, as to the latter, the Constitution and more than two centuries of
history make clear the institutions in which competence is lodged to make such
normative national decisions. In some instances of international coopera-
7. See generally Adam B. Jaffe, Steven R. Peterson, Paul R. Portney & Robert M. Stavins,
EnvironmentalRegulation and the Competitiveness ofU.S. Manufacturing: WhatDoes the Evidence Tell
Us?, 33 J. BeON. LIT. 132 (1995).
8. Arik Levinson, EnvironmentalRegulationsandManufacturers'Location Choices:Evidencefrom
the Census ofManufactures, _ J. PUB. BeON. _ (forthcoming).
9. Arik Levinson, Environmental Regulation and Industry Location: International and Domestic
Evidence, in FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION, supra note 7, at 450.
10. Joel R. Paul, Free Trade, Regulatory Competition and the Autonomous Market Fallacy, 1
COLUM. J. EURO. L. 29 (1995).
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tion-for example, NAFTA or the formation of the new WTO-a multilateral
agreement explicitly specifies how a standard should be set and adherence to
it enforced. But this is, of course, a positive, descriptive answer, not a
normative response, to the question posed here about the selection of the
harmonized standard.
To be sure, citizens of one country may well be-they undoubtedly
are-concerned about the well-being of their fellow human beings in other
countries; this is a set of externalities that surely must be weighed. (Guido
Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed use the term "moralisms" to refer to the
class of externalities of which these are examples. 11) But recall that such
direct spillovers are put to the side in the sharpest of the cases for a race to the
bottom and the need to cope with it.
Second, if the citizens of one country are concerned about the well-being
of populations elsewhere-if the condition of distant populations enters the
utility functions of citizens of a given country-why should that concern
manifest itself with respect to specific aspects of the distant folks' lives? Why
not be concerned instead about their overall well-being, the utility or welfare
they perceive themselves as achieving? One can make an argument that some
goods or living conditions satisfy what Richard A. Musgrave called "merit
wants"12 or that they constitute elements of living with respect to which James
Tobin would argue we believe in "specific egalitarianism."13 But who is the
"one" in the first clause and the "we" in the second, and what if the people
whom we (or one) would have adopt these standards do not agree? Again, this
merit want or specific egalitarianism argument does not seem to be at the heart
of the concern of those who would end the international race to the bottom
with harmonization.
Given a deeper sense of shared values among citizens of the same country,
however, it is arguable that specific egalitarianism or concern about the
provision for merit wants is more likely to motivate efforts to avoid the ill
effects of a race to the bottom among states in a federal structure. Neverthe-
less, even within such a setting, the advocacy of harmonization or uniformity
may simply reflect the attempt of one group of citizens to impose its
preferences on other groups.
Supposing, then, that there is a race to the bottom, is the fixing of a
uniform standard in each area of concern-environment, labor, competition
policy, and so on-the optimal response? Put the opposite way, what is the
optimal diversity of standards, and is the answer none? There is no doubt that
uniformity of laws or standards has its virtues. If all units of the zidget part of
11. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View ofthe Cathedral, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1089 (1972).
12. See generally RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBUC FINANCE (1959).
13. See generally James Tobin, limiting the Domain ofInequality, 13 J.L. & BeaN. 263 (1970).
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each widget conform to the same specifications, it facilitates trade, enables
widget manufacturers in anyone country to meet their need for zidgets from
anyone of a number of sources, and presumably satisfies consumers'
preferences more efficiently. The recently developed literature on standards
that are adopted to ensure compatibility in goods or services with network
externalities highlights the importance of uniformity. The continuing debates
and discussions about worldwide adherence to the metric system provide
another example of a context in which uniformity's virtues seem real and have
been extolled.
In each of these cases, however, there is a spillover effect or externality to
any one participant's adoption of the standard. Indeed, in the network
externalities case, an innovative firm with a superior product might depart from
a previously uniform standard to gain a competitive advantage. Another way
of putting the point is to observe that in each of the cases mentioned, there are
economies of scale in the adoption of the standard.
Consider the level of environmental quality in a particular country and
assume, as we have been doing, that there is no spillover to any other
country's environment or population. What is the argument for requiring the
same standard in this country that has been adopted in another country? What
is the positive force pressing for uniformity? It is difficult to see one. Rather
it is the argument against imposing uniformity and for allowing diversity that
is compelling.
First, we know that if the international trading system is functioning
effectively, economies with different resource endowments, preferences, and
technologies will use different input combinations, produce different output
vectors, and consume different quantities of goods and services. This well
known result is nicely reviewed in a recent contribution by Jagdish Bhagwati
and T.N. Srinivasan.14 Allowing diversity in standards simply allows the
tailoring to local circumstances that emerges in the standard trade equilibrium.
Moreover, even in models that allow strategic behavior with regard to
choice of legal and capital infrastructure to attract firms to a region, the
equilibrium can entail diverse levels of infrastructure-for example, environ-
mental standards-and yet be efficient. That is, starting at such an equilibrium,
coordination would not enhance the aggregate well-being of the two competing
regions. Such is the conclusion that Ian King, R. Preston McAfee, and Linda
Welling reach in their analysis of two governments competing to have a firm
locate in their respective regions. IS A similar result emerges in a model of tax
competition between two countries-where favorable tax treatment is intended
14. 1agdishBhagwati&T.N. Srinivasan, Trade andtheEnvironment:DoesEnvironmentalDiversity
Detraetfrom the Casefor Free Trade?, in FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION, supra note 1.
15. See generally Ian King, R. Preston McAfee & Linda Welling, Industrial Blackmail: Dynamic
Tax Competition and Public Investment, 26 CANADIAN 1. ECON. 590 (1993).
183
HeinOnline -- 14 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 184 1996
Constructing a New Federalism Symposium Issue: 177, 1996
to induce consumers to shop in the home country and hence cause domestic
businesses to thrive. Ravi Kanbur and Michael Keen demonstrate that joint
revenue maximization by the two competing governments does not generally
require uniform tax rates. 16
A second reason for permitting diverse standards to coexist and for not
imposing uniformity on all countries derives from our collective uncertainty
about what the correct standard is. In the face of such uncertainty, imposing
a uniform standard risks subjecting all countries to the wrong requirement. It
also removes the possibility of learning, from experimentation with diverse
standards, both what the immediate effects of different standards are and how
economic agents respond to them. In the presence of uncertainty about the
optimal standard, caution and flexibility are desirable. Imposing a uniform
standard seems to be a move in precisely the wrong direction. This argument
corresponds, in the context of federalism, to the often-invoked image of the
states as laboratories of democracy.
Finally, the imposition of uniform standards, whether with regard to the
environment, working conditions, or the like, effectively redistributes wealth
among countries. Suppose, for example, that the population of one country,
call it Precisia, is by nature-by genetic endowment alone-extraordinarily
careful when working with complex machinery. Then imposing on the people
of Precisia the same occupational safety standards as are imposed on all other
countries would diminish the value of their resource endowment. They would
be forced to bear costs of production that they need not incur, and the value
attached to their super-careful approach would be diminished. The imposition
of a uniform occupational safety standard would effectively redistribute wealth
from Precisians to citizens of other countries. To be sure, this may be an
extreme example, but the point is general: Imposing a uniform standard
diminishes the wealth of those countries that have the capacity-because either
of the technology they possess or their predilection-to do perfectly well with
a lower standard.
In the international setting, the argument for uniformity is stronger, though
still not entirely unproblematic, at the level of the decisionmaking process.
That is, the case is stronger for harmonizing the process by which standards
are set. One wants to try to assure that all the relevant information and values
are weighed when a government decides on an environmental standard, an
occupational health and safety standard, a competition policy. If the process is
flawed, if relevant information is not considered or if. particular views are
deliberately ignored, then an argument can be made that the government is
intentionally tilting the playing field.
16. See generally Ravi Kanbur & Michael Keen. Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax
Coordination When Countries Differ in Size, 83 AMER. ECON. REv. 877 (1993).
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Even at this process level, however, there is a potential problem in
imposing uniformity because the differences in process may reflect differences
in the fundamental values of different populations. But this rapidly takes us into
the domain of moral philosophy and out of the realm where economists and
lawyers have any comparative advantage. Attempting to reach agreement on
harmonized decision processes for setting environmental and labor standards
will serve, however, to isolate and identify the more fundamental disagree-
ments that need to be understood, whether or not they can be resolved. The
irreducible minimum of harmonization that is required, and that seems
justifiable, relates to characteristics of the standard-setting process. In
particular, the process must be sufficiently transparent that such disagreements
can be identified.
Having said that, however, there are problems even with imposing and
enforcing a uniform process-oriented value of transparency. Making difficult
choices nontransparent may be valuable-to some societies all the time, to
some just when they are faced with particular choices. The point is made
effectively in the discussion of tragic choices by Guido Calabresi and Philip
Bobbitt. 17 But even if there were a shared appreciation of the value of
transparency, how effectively could that element of uniformity be achieved and
monitored in the face of disparate political systems-some unitary, some
federal; some democratic, some nondemocratic; some two-party, some with
more diffuse centers of power? How would the entity assigned the task of
assessing the process ascertain what interests and whose interests had been
represented and effectively voiced? How would this discussion be disentangled
if the society relied on a noisy, broadly participatory process rather than a
systematic, univocal bureaucratic approach where expertise is more valued?
Perhaps the difficulty of assuring clear, deliberate decisionmaking processes
leads those who worry about a race to the bottom, and its consequences, to
advocate harmonization of standards themselves rather than of processes. But
then we are brought back to the earlier question, Are critics of putative races
to the bottom in the international setting principally concerned with failures of
external markets in which countries participate or with perceived shortcomings
in the internal political systems of those countries?
This last set of questions helps to highlight major differences between races
to the bottom that might occur in an international context and their counterparts
in our federal system. First, the established similarities of the democratic
decisionmaking processes of states already achieve the harmonization of
processes that might be only a goal of a policy to cope with an international
race to the bottom. The transparency of the standard-setting processes of the
putative competitors is already achieved even if the ordinary operations of
17. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI & PInUP BOBBnT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978).
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democratic processes may not reveal with crystal clarity the way a particular
choice was made. The political systems of the different state jurisdictions
within our federal union do not present the kinds and levels of disparities that
make problematic the attainment of transparency in the case of different
countries.
Second, to the extent that critics of putative races to the bottom among
states are concerned about the outcomes of political processes within states,
rather than with the failure of markets in which states compete, their critique
may well have a firmer foundation than do the objections of observers of a
perceived international race. To be sure, the outcome-for example, the
environmental standard that is set-being criticized is the result of a political
process wholly internal to a state. But the outcome affects the well-being of
people who are fellow citizens of the critic who lives in the country of which
that state is a part. To the extent that the outcome of the process within the
state deprives someone or some group of an entitlement that he or she deserves
as a citizen of the federal union, the critic's complaint is well grounded. The
shortcoming of the internal political system of the state becomes a failure of
the internal political system of the country in delivering on its commitments to
its citizens.
But this still leaves several major tasks for the observer who perceives
states in the federal system to be racing to the bottom. The critic needs to
establish that the conditions under which, in theory, such a race might develop
actually obtain and that the deprivations to which citizens of one or more of the
competing states are consequently subject constitute defaults on the entitlements
of citizens of the country those states comprise.
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